Financial development, remittances, and real exchange rate appreciation by Pablo A. Acosta et al.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
Economic
Review
Number 1, 2009
Financial Development,  
Remittances, and Real  
Exchange Rate Appreciation
Pablo A. Acosta, Nicole Rae Baerg,
and Federico S. MandelmanPRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Dennis L. Lockhart
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND 
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH
DaviD e. aLtig
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
thomas J. cunningham, vice PresiDent anD 
associate Director of research
geraLD P. Dwyer Jr., vice PresiDent
John c. robertson, vice PresiDent
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
bobbie h. mccrackin, vice PresiDent
Lynn h. foLey, eDitor
tom heintJes, managing eDitor
JiLL DibLe anD Peter hamiLton, Designers
vanessa fLoccari, marketing anD circuLation
charLotte wesseLs, aDministrative assistance
The Economic Review of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta presents analysis of economic and 
financial topics relevant to Federal Reserve policy. 
In a format accessible to the nonspecialist, the 
publication reflects the work of the bank’s Research 
Department. It is edited, designed, and produced 
through the Public Affairs Department.
Views expressed in the Economic Review are not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.
Material may be reprinted or abstracted if the  
Economic Review and author are credited. 
To sign up for e-mail notifications when articles  
are published online, please visit www.frbatlanta. 
org and click the “Subscribe” link on the home 
page. For further information, contact the Public 
Affairs Department, Federal Reserve Bank of  
Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, 
Georgia 30309-4470 (404.498.8020).
ISSN 0732-1813
Federal reserve Bank oF atlanta
Economic Review
Volume 94, Number 1, 2009
Financial Development, Remittances,  
and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation
Pablo A. Acosta, Nicole Rae Baerg, and Federico S. Mandelman*
For developing countries, remittances are an important and expanding source of 
capital, equivalent to two-thirds of overall foreign direct investment and nearly 
2 percent of gross domestic product. 
This article examines the relationship between remittance inflows, financial 
sector development, and the real exchange rate. The authors test whether  
financial sector development can prevent appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. In particular, they show that well-developed financial sectors can more  
effectively channel remittances into investment opportunities. 
Using panel data for 109 developing and transition countries for 1990–2003, 
the authors find that remittances by themselves tend to put upward pressure on 
the real exchange rate. But this effect is weaker in countries with deeper and 
more sophisticated financial markets, which seem to retain trade competitiveness. 
JEL classification: F40, F41, O10
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O
ver the past decade, the aggregate value of remittances to recipient countries has soared. 
For instance, in 2007 aggregate remittances peaked at $240 billion dollars, up from a mere 
$2.98 billion dollars in 1975 and $90 billion dollars in 2003 (World Bank 2008b). Official (recorded) 
remittances have surpassed total amounts of official development assistance and now represent 
approximately two-thirds of overall foreign direct investment (see Figure 1). Furthermore, remittances 
account for an estimated 1.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the developing world 
(World Bank 2008b). Thus, remittances have become an increasingly important source of external 
financing for developing countries. 
Economists have thoroughly examined the micro and macro effects of migrant remittances on 
receiving countries. Research shows that remittances can increase physical and human capital for 
recipient households (Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Fajnzylber and 
Lopez 2008; Yang 2008) and can reduce overall poverty levels (Adams and Page 2005; Acosta et 
al. 2008). More importantly for this article, remittances can exert pressure on the real exchange 
rate, leading to appreciation of the local currency (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004; Acosta, Lartey, 
and Mandelman 2007; Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo 2007; Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta 2008). 
Simply, this pressure on the real exchange rate is analogous to “Dutch disease” dynamics: Developing 
countries receive aggregate inflows from migrants working abroad, and this increase in financial 
capital puts upward pressure on recipient countries’ local currency. 
This effect stems from the fact that additional income in the form of remittances is mostly 
consumed, in particular on nontradable goods and services. If such funds were otherwise channeled 
through investment, the real exchange rate appreciation would attenuate or even disappear (Acosta, 
Lartey, and Mandelman 2007; Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo 2007). We argue in this article that such 
attenuation is dependent upon the level of financial development in the recipient country. 
Several studies show that investment rates are typically higher in countries with a well-developed 
financial sector (King and Levine 1993; Levine and Zervos 1998; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). 
Therefore, we expect that high-remittance recipient countries with comparatively better developed 
financial systems can more effectively direct remittance flows toward investment activities. We 
predict, therefore, that upward pressure on the real exchange rate is weaker in countries with 
comparatively better developed financial sectors. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first to directly tackle the interactive relationship between remittances, the real exchange rate, 
and financial development in developing countries. 
We  contribute  to  the  literature  by  specifying  how  financial  development  helps  maintain 
a competitive exchange rate in an environment of growing remittances. Our results show that 
financial development can attenuate real exchange rate appreciation. 
The article begins with a review of the literature on remittances, financial development, and the 
exchange rate. The next sections present the methodology, descriptive statistics, data, and empirical 
results. The article concludes with brief comments and policy recommendations.
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1. Note that “leisure” is a catchall word for such nonemployment activities as investment in additional schooling 
  and childcare.
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Figure 1
Remittances and other capital flows to developing countries
Note: Data for 2007 are estimates. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (2008); World Bank (2005, 2008a, 2008c)
A review of other studies
Dutch disease and real exchange rate appreciation. The term Dutch disease, often used in 
the literature, generally refers to any upward pressure on the real exchange rate resulting from 
financial capital inflows such as foreign aid, natural resource booms, or, as we explore in this article, 
migrant remittances. Upward pressure on the exchange rate is thought to harm the tradable sector. 
This pressure can be explained using two different mechanisms. 
The first mechanism is demonstrated in the Salter-Swan-Conder-Dornbusch model, which 
assumes  that  prices  for  tradable  goods  are  exogenously  determined.  This  model  points  to  a 
“spending effect,” by which the increase in wealth following higher capital inflows, combined with 
exogenous tradable prices, causes the prices of nontradable goods and services to rise. These 
higher prices lead to an expansion in the nontradable sector. By definition, an increase in the price 
of nontradables relative to the price of tradables translates into real exchange rate appreciation. 
The expansion of the nontradable sector creates a “resource movement effect,” drawing additional 
resources toward the sector. Both the spending effect and the resource movement effect put 
upward pressure on the local currency (Corden and Neary 1982). 
A second mechanism, discussed in Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman (2007), is that remittances 
tend to increase household aggregate wealth. An increase in household wealth may lead to a 
decrease in labor supply as households substitute more leisure for work.1 A shrinking labor supply, 
in turn, puts upward pressure on wages. Rising wages raise production costs, and higher production 
costs can lead to a further contraction of the tradable sector. Both the resource reallocation 
effects and the labor effects can cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, thereby reducing the 
international competitiveness of the tradable sector, and may lead to tradable sector contraction, 
higher wages, and higher production costs. 
Empirical evidence seems to support both views. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2004), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Winters and Martins (2005), and Lopez, Molina, and 
Bussolo (2007) all find that remittances can, in fact, cause real exchange rate appreciation. Other 
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studies test the hypothesis that remittances may lead to a decrease in the labor supply, finding 
empirical support in El Salvador (Acosta 2006), Mexico (Hanson 2007), and other countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Fajnzylber and Lopez 2008). 
Financial sector development. The literature on remittances and financial sector development 
presents myriad theoretical arguments and mixed statistical results. Researchers argue that 
remittances can contribute to financial sector development if recipients deposit remittances into 
domestic banks (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2006; Fajnzylber and Lopez 2008). 
However, there is still a debate on whether the development impact of remittances is higher in more 
financially developed countries. While Mundaca (2005) shows that remittances’ impact on growth 
increases with financial development, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) find evidence that remittances 
boost growth in countries with less developed financial systems. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz interpret 
their result by noting that remittances may provide an alternative way to finance investment and help 
overcome liquidity constraints. On the other hand, Alberola and Salvado (2006) and Freund and 
Spatafora (2008) argue that financial development and market competition stemming from additional 
bank entry can stimulate higher remittance flows to the country by reducing transaction costs. 
What can help mitigate the loss of international competitiveness caused by the Dutch disease 
effects of remittances? In an attempt to integrate the aforementioned literature, we argue that 
financial sector development is important. Like Mundaca (2005), we expect that remittances can 
potentially increase growth, but we qualify her argument. Her conclusion may be true if the propensity 
to invest is great enough that the effect of remittances attenuates the exchange appreciation effects. 
In particular, we argue that a well-developed financial sector can help channel remittances into 
investment opportunities and that these new opportunities can lead to higher growth. 
Our methodology, data, and descriptive statistics
Methodology. To test our hypothesis, we specify a model that uses a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator, which is tailored to deal with potential endogeneity in all explanatory variables 
and thus helps account for unobserved determinants of real exchange rate evolution. Panel data 
estimation techniques test remittances’ effect on real exchange rate appreciation. To address the 
impact of financial market development on the exchange rate, we use two measures—bank credit as 
a share of GDP and bank deposits as a share of GDP (see Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez 
Peria 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001)—as proxies for financial development. 
The dynamic equation is 
(1) yit = a´xit + b´rit + d´rit * fit + q´fit + hi + lt + eit,
where y is the real exchange rate index, x represents a set of explanatory variables, r is remittance 
flows (as a share of GDP), f represents financial development (bank credit or deposits as a share of 
GDP), h is an unobserved country-specific effect, l is a time-specific effect, and e is the error term. 
An identification problem may arise if some of the explanatory variables are correlated with 
the error term. To prevent this problem, we estimate all equations, including equation (1) and 
its first-differenced version as a system of equations, using the GMM system estimator, which 
allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables or other 
variables as instruments. In our case, we use both “internal” and “external” instruments. Since 
all of our internal instruments are likely to be correlated with the error term, we include the 
first lagged difference and the second lag level of all explanatory variables. Following Aggarwal, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2006), we also add two external instruments: the primary 
school enrollment rate and the weighted GDP per capita for each of the five main migrant host 
countries. We designate this model GMM-IV.
The validity of the lagged differences of the explanatory variables as instruments holds under 
two conditions: (1) that the differences of the explanatory variable and the errors are uncorrelated FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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and (2) that there is no serial correlation in the errors. Since the validity of instruments determines 
whether the GMM-IV estimator is consistent or not, we employ two specification tests: The standard 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions evaluates the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid overall. The Arellano and Bond (1991) test evaluates the null hypothesis that no second-order 
serial correlation exists in the differenced error term. Note that first-order correlation is expected 
in the differenced equation, even if the error term is uncorrelated, unless it follows a random walk. 
By contrast, the presence of second-order correlation indicates that serial correlation exists in the 
error term and that it follows a moving average process at least of order one.
As in Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo (2007) and Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2008), we use a 
real effective exchange rate (REER) index as a measure of the real exchange rate. We begin with 
a nominal effective exchange rate index that is the ratio of a currency’s period-average exchange 
rate over a weighted geometric average of exchange rates for the currencies of selected countries. 
These geometric averages are weighted by each country’s trade in both manufactured goods and 
primary products. A REER index represents the nominal effective exchange rate index, adjusted 
for relative changes in consumer prices, a reasonable proxy of cost indicators for the home country. 
Since the REER is defined as the price of domestic goods relative to foreign goods, an increase in 
REER implies a real exchange rate appreciation. 
Following Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2008), other explanatory variables that enter our 
baseline model (vector x) include excess money growth, terms of trade, trade openness, GDP per 
capita, and GDP growth. 
Excess money growth can put upward pressure on the prices of nontradable goods, which 
may produce inflationary tendencies in the economy and independently cause an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. Variations in the external terms of trade can also alter the real exchange 
rate. For instance, a positive shock to the price of exports relative to imports may result in a real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
The trade openness variable proxies trade restrictions and captures how such policies influence 
the real exchange rate through their impact on the price of nontradables. For instance, an increase 
in import tariffs raises the price of imported goods, which can affect prices of nontradables through 
income and substitution effects. The negative income effect from higher import prices may decrease 
demand for all goods and services, putting downward pressure on the prices of nontradable goods. 
Downward pressure in nontradable prices can cause a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The 
substitution effect, on the other hand, may cause an increase in demand for nontradables as consumers 
switch away from imported goods. This substitution effect would boost the price of nontradables and 
could cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. Some studies have argued that the substitution 
effect is likely to dominate; therefore, a tightening of trade restrictions can cause a real exchange rate 
appreciation (Edwards 1989). We account for this argument in our model.
Finally, higher GDP per capita is expected to increase incomes and hence increase demand for 
nontradables. However, recent experiences in emerging economies indicate that intermittent periods 
of large portfolio capital inflows are associated with a consumption boom, very robust GDP growth, 
increasing demand for imports, and sizable trade deficits (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 2004). In 
general, an overexpansion in the economy is often followed by currency depreciation in order to 
correct any external deficits. With this tendency in mind, we also control for GDP growth. 
Data. We use an unbalanced panel data set comprising 109 developing and transition countries 
for the period 1990–2003. Countries were selected based on data availability, and we use only 
countries that have at least three consecutive years of information available on remittance flows. 
Table 1 reports country and period coverage. Although we have 1,370 country-year observations 
with remittance data, sample sizes are typically smaller in the regressions that follow and depend on 
the availability of covariates included. Remittance data are from the World Bank (2008b); REERs are 
from International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund); the remaining data are from 
the World Bank (2008c). GDP per capital is reported in constant (2000) U.S. dollars.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 1, 2009 5
Country  Year coverage  Country  Year coverage
Albania  1992–2003  Macedonia, FYR  1993–2003
Antigua and Barbuda  1990–2003  Madagascar  1990–2003
Argentina  1992–2003  Malawi  1994–2003
Armenia  1995–2003  Malaysia  1990–2003
Azerbaijan  1995, 1998–2003  Mali  1990–2003
Bangladesh  1990–2003  Mauritania  1990–2003
Barbados  1990–2003  Mauritius  1990–2003
Belarus  1993–2003  Mexico  1990–2003
Belize  1990–2003  Moldova  1995–2003
Benin  1990–2003  Mongolia  1998–2003
Bolivia  1990–2003  Morocco  1990–2003
Botswana  1990–2003  Mozambique  1990–2003
Brazil  1990–2003  Myanmar  1990–2003
Bulgaria  1996–2003  Namibia  1990–2003
Burkina Faso  1990–2003  Nepal  1993–2003
Cambodia  1992–2003  Nicaragua  1992–2003
Cameroon  1990–2003  Niger  1990–2003
Cape Verde  1990–2003  Nigeria  1990–2003
China  1990–2003  Oman  1990–2003
Colombia  1990–2003  Pakistan  1990–2003
Comoros  1990–2003  Panama  1990–2003
Congo, Rep.  1995–2003  Papua New Guinea  1990–2003
Costa Rica  1990–2003  Paraguay  1990–2003
Cote d’Ivoire  1990–2003  Peru  1990–2003
Croatia  1993–2003  Philippines  1990–2003
Dominica  1990–2003  Poland  1994–2003
Dominican Republic  1990–2003  Romania  1994–2003
Ecuador  1990–2003  Russian Federation  1994–2003
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1990–2003  Samoa  1990–2003
El Salvador  1990–2003  Sao Tome and Principe  1990, 1998–2003
Estonia  1994–2003  Senegal  1990–2003
Ethiopia  1990–2003  Sierra Leone  1990–2003
Fiji  1990–2003  Slovak Republic  1990–2003
Gabon  1995–2003  South Africa  1990–2003
Ghana  1990–2003  Sri Lanka  1990–2003
Grenada  1990–2003  St. Kitts and Nevis  1990–2003
Guatemala  1990–2003  St. Lucia  1990–2003
Guinea  1994–2003  St. Vincent and the Grenadines  1990–2003
Guyana  1992–2003  Sudan  1990–2003
Haiti  1990–2003  Swaziland  1990–2003
Honduras  1990–2003  Syrian Arab Republic  1990–2003
Hungary  1995–2003  Tajikistan  1997–2003
India  1990–2003  Tanzania  1995–2003
Indonesia  1990–2003  Thailand  1990–2003
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1991–2003  Togo  1990–2003
Jamaica  1990–2003  Trinidad and Tobago  1990–2003
Jordan  1990–2003  Tunisia  1990–2003
Kazakhstan  1995–2003  Turkey  1990–2003
Kenya  1990–2003  Uganda  1999–2003
Kyrgyz Republic  1993–2003  Ukraine  1996–2003
Lao PDR  1990–2003  Vanuatu  1990–2003
Latvia  1996–2003  Venezuela, RB  1990–2003
Lebanon  1990–2003  Yemen, Rep.  1990–2003
Lesotho  1990–2003  Zimbabwe  1990–1994
Lithuania  1993–2003
Table 1
Coverage for remittance dataFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Descriptive statistics. Figure 2 shows preliminary evidence of real exchange rate appreciation 
following  an  increase  in  remittance  flows.  The  figure  breaks  down  countries  with  both  well-
developed and underdeveloped financial sectors and illustrates the evolution of the REER between 
1990 and 2003 in four high-remittance recipient countries: El Salvador (remittances representing 
14.7 percent of GDP in 2003), Honduras (12.4 percent of GDP in 2003), India (3.5 percent), and 
the Philippines (13 percent). In the first two countries, where bank credit amounts to less than   
32 percent of GDP, a clear positive relationship exists between remittance flows and real exchange 
rate appreciation. However, for the latter two countries, with bank credit surpassing 50 percent of 
GDP, such a relationship no longer holds. Even though remittances have been increasing steadily 
in the sample period, the REER evolution has been erratic in India and the Philippines. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. In all developing regions, remittances have 
increased in absolute terms and as a share of GDP in the last decade. In particular, between 1995 
and 2003 remittance flows increased threefold in East Asia as well as in the Pacific and South Asia 
and more than doubled in Latin American and Caribbean countries. At the same time, developing 
countries have on average experienced real exchange rate appreciation. A simple average of East 
Asian and Pacific currencies shows an appreciation of around 41 percent between 1995 and 2003, 
while for other developing regions currencies have appreciated on average between 1.6 percent and 
17.9 percent during the same period. A priori, no relationship seems to exist between bank credit 
and bank deposit levels and real exchange rate appreciation. East Asia and the Pacific and the 
Middle East and Northern Africa regions stand out in terms of financial development in comparison 
with the rest of the developing world.
The next section clarifies whether this relationship can be generalized and whether the 
correlation remains valid after controlling for other macroeconomic variables and after accounting 
for endogeneity.
Figure 2
Remittances and real effective exchange rate evolution for selected countries
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REER
Remittances/GDP
REER
Remittances/GDP
REER
Remittances/GDP
Remittances/GDP
REER
1990–2003 credit/GDP = 4.8
1990–2003 credit/GDP = 50.5
1990–2003 credit/GDP = 31.6
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Our empirical results
Table 3 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) country fixed-effects results where the dependent 
variable is the real exchange rate index. Control variables include GDP per capita, M2 (a monetary 
aggregate) as a percent of GDP, a terms-of-trade index (goods and services), trade openness 
(the sum of exports and imports as a percent of GDP), GDP growth (as a percentage), and year 
indicators. A positive coefficient shows that an increase in the variable causes a real exchange rate 
appreciation. The first column shows that an increase of 1 percentage point in the remittances-to-
GDP ratio generates a real exchange rate appreciation of 0.4 percentage points, with the coefficient 
being statistically significant at a 10 percent level. The other covariates exhibit the expected signs, 
and most of them are statistically significant as well, with the exception of trade openness and 
excess money growth. 
We then introduce measures of financial development, both solely and interacted with 
remittances. The first proxy variable for financial development, the ratio of bank credit to GDP, is 
shown in the second column of Table 3. While remittances by themselves tend to cause the real 
exchange rate to appreciate, in countries with higher credit such an effect is attenuated. A similar 
conclusion is reached when the variable measuring financial access is bank deposits to GDP (results 
shown in the third column).
As mentioned in the previous section, our estimates could be biased if any explanatory variable 
is correlated with unobserved time-varying determinants of real exchange rate evolution. Therefore, 
we employ the GMM-IV system estimator (with both internal and external instruments), and Table 4 
presents results analogous to those in Table 3. In all considered specifications, the estimations 
satisfy the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions and the serial correlation tests, indicating 
that the internal and external instruments included are valid. The large number of explanatory 
variables, accompanied by a relatively large p-value for the Sargan test estimates, raises a concern 
about a potential overfitting bias. However, we found no clear pattern in the coefficient estimates 
when we reduced or increased the number of instruments.2 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in remittances causes 
the average currency to appreciate by 0.29 percentage points. This impact is smaller compared with 
  Total remittances  Remittances/  REER  Bank  Bank
  (US$mil)  GDP  appreciation   credits/GDP  deposits/GDP
Region  Countries  1995  2003  1995  2003  (%), 1995–2003  1995  2003  1995  2003
East Asia and the Pacific  13  9,690  32,500  0.78  1.66  40.79  50.12  62.65  43.33  56.36
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  21  7,970  12,100  0.85  0.96  14.16  28.70  31.99  20.72  27.62
Latin America and the Caribbean  28  13,400  34,900  0.85  2.13  2.85  50.81  52.75  33.30  39.14
Middle East and North Africa  9  11,600  18,100  4.75  5.20  17.92  64.43  79.16  44.49  56.60
South Asia  5  10,000  30,400  2.12  4.08  1.57  39.68  46.24  28.74  41.55
Sub-Saharan Africa  33  3,150  5,730  1.07  1.55  1.85  26.22  25.80  18.56  24.17
Total  109  57,805  133,730  1.17  2.12  10.43  39.74  43.50  28.89  37.71
Note: Remittance figures correspond to total flows received by the region. REER appreciation, bank credit, and bank deposit figures correspond to country simple averages in each region.
Source: World Bank (2008b, 2008c) and International Finance Statistics (International Monetary Fund)
Table 2
Summary statistics by region, 1995–2003
2. An interesting observation from the GMM estimation is the negative coefficient on GDP growth, in contrast to the 
  positive sign in the OLS fixed-effects estimation. While the basic OLS model probably describes the standard associa- 
  tion between economic growth and real exchange rate appreciation, the GMM coefficient captures the isolated exog- 
  enous impact of economic growth on real exchange rates, which in this case is negative. The GMM finding is consistent 
  with the aforementioned argument.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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the fixed-effects estimate (column 1 in Table 3) although it is still statistically significant at a   
1 percent level. Column 2 confirms the aforementioned result: A country with higher bank credit 
as a percentage of GDP can assuage exchange rate appreciation. For instance, an increase of   
1 percentage point in the ratio of remittances to GDP in a country where bank credit represents 
20 percent of GDP generates a currency appreciation of 0.422 percentage points (0.542 – 0.006 * 
20). However, a similar increase in a country with 60 percent of bank credit/GDP causes the real 
exchange rate to appreciated only 0.185 percentage points (0.542 – 0.006 * 60). Also note that, for 
a given remittance level, an increase in bank credit/GDP would generate depreciation in the real 
exchange rate; this effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)
          
Remittances (% GDP)  0.403*  1.773***  3.426***
  (0.239)  (0.416)  (0.800)
     
Bank credits (% GDP)    0.060   
    (0.047)   
     
Remittances (% GDP) * bank credits (% GDP)    –0.017*** 
    (0.004) 
     
Bank deposits (% GDP)       0.010
       (0.189)
     
Remittances (% GDP) * bank deposits (% GDP)      –0.043***
      (0.016)
     
GDP per capita (US$000s)  10.882***  9.376***  11.773***
  (3.125)  (3.122)  (3.363)
     
M2 (% GDP)  0.143  0.223*  0.267
  (0.095)  (0.114)  (0.199)
     
Terms of trade (goods and services)  0.289***  0.288***  0.385***
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.048)
     
Trade openness (X + M/GDP)  0.038  0.018  0.043
  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.062)
     
GDP growth (%)  0.199***  0.191***  0.203***
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.053)
     
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes
     
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes
          
Observations  884  882  748
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; **, significance at the 5 percent level; and *, significance at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.
Table 3
Fixed effects estimation for remittances, financial development, and the real exchange rate
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We obtain similar results when the variable measuring financial development is the ratio of 
bank deposits to GDP. A country with 20 percent of bank deposits to GDP raises the currency 
approximately 1.788 percentage points. On the other hand, this effect diminished to 0.508 in a 
country with 60 percent of bank deposits to GDP. Therefore, our results support the hypothesis 
that financial sector development can help mitigate any real exchange rate appreciation generated 
by additional remittance flows.
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)
          
Remittances (% GDP)  0.294***  0.542***  2.428**
  (0.069)  (0.161)  (0.082)
     
Bank credits (% GDP)    –0.043*** 
    (0.013) 
     
Remittances (% GDP) * bank credits (% GDP)    –0.006** 
    (0.003) 
     
Bank deposits (% GDP)      –0.128
      (0.134)
     
Remittances (% GDP) * bank deposits (% GDP)      –0.032**
      (0.015)
     
GDP per capita (US$000s)  0.810***  1.112***  1.212***
  (0.241)  (0.297)  (0.395)
     
M2 (% GDP)  –0.120***  –0.036  0.079
  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.116)
     
Terms of trade (goods and services)  0.384***  0.378***  0.554***
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.032)
     
Trade openness (X + M/GDP)  0.232***  0.216***  0.128***
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.025)
     
GDP growth (%)  –0.210***  –0.187***  0.025
  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.034)
     
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes
     
Observations  884  882  748
Sargan test  0.978  1.000  1.000
AR(1)  0.004  0.004  0.001
AR(2)  0.120  0.166  0.268
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; **, significance at the 5 percent level; and *, significance at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. The estimation is two-step. Instruments include the first lagged difference and the second lagged level of remittances, bank credits, bank deposits, 
GDP per capita, M2, terms of trade, trade openness, and GDP growth, as well as the first lagged level of two external instruments—primary school enrollment rates 
and weighted GDP per capita of the five main migrant host countries (weighted by migrant stocks).
Table 4
GMM-IV system estimation for remittances, financial development, and the real exchange rate 
(dependent variable is the real exchange rate index)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Finally, we ask whether these results hold for countries with legal systems of different 
origins. It is often argued that countries with a British-origin legal system have a long tradition 
in finance and that this tradition enables the countries to be more efficient in channeling funds 
into investment activities through the financial sector. If this argument is true, we would expect 
remittance  recipient  countries  with  British-origin  legal  systems  to  more  effectively  channel 
capital into investment needs. These countries, therefore, should be less likely to exhibit currency 
appreciation upon receiving higher remittance flows. We divide the sample between countries 
with legal systems of either British or non-British origin; Table 5 reports results for both subsamples. 
The countries with British ties do not seem to exhibit local currency appreciation of the same 
magnitude as the countries without British legal traditions. 
10
  Sample
Variables  British legal origin  Non-British legal origin
   
Remittances (% GDP)  –1.120  2.435***
  (2.528)  (0.561)
   
Bank credits (% GDP)  –0.401***  0.077
  (0.107)  (0.050)
   
Remittances (% GDP) * bank credits (% GDP)  0.033  –0.032***
  (0.039)  (0.007)
   
GDP per capita (US$000s)  3.966***  1.685**
  (1.388)  (0.799)
   
M2 (% GDP)  0.648**  0.203***
  (0.275)  (0.076)
   
Terms of trade (goods and services)  0.380***  0.282***
  (0.132)  (0.036)
   
Trade openness (X + M/GDP)  0.020  0.200***
  (0.075)  (0.034)
   
GDP growth (%)  0.521***  –0.186***
  (0.147)  (0.060)
   
Year indicators  Yes  Yes
   
Observations  307  575
Sargan test  1.000  1.000
AR(1)  0.002  0.054
AR(2)  0.079  0.523
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; **, significance at the 5 percent level; and *, significance at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. The estimation is two-step. Instruments include the first lagged difference and the second lagged level of remittances, bank credits, GDP per capita, 
M2, terms of trade, trade openness, and GDP growth, as well as the first lagged level of two external instruments—primary school enrollment rates and weighted GDP 
per capita of the five main migrant host countries (weighted by migrant stocks).
Table 5
GMM-IV system estimation for remittances, credit, legal origin, and the real exchange rate
(dependent variable is the real exchange rate index)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Conclusion
We study the effect of remittances on the real effective exchange rate conditional on the level of 
financial sector maturity. Like several other studies, our study argues that remittances can raise the 
exchange rate. We argue, however, that how much the local currency appreciates depends on how 
well the domestic economy can channel the remitted capital into new investments. Thus, countries 
with deeper and more sophisticated financial markets should help assuage the appreciation effects 
of remittances on the local currency. 
We find empirical support for this hypothesis, with robust results using a variety of measures 
and an assortment of different econometric model specifications. Moreover, our argument can 
be generalized. The financial sector mitigates local currency appreciation, helping to keep the 
domestic economy internationally competitive. In addition, financial market development may 
prove to be a key way to manage Dutch disease effects more broadly. Our empirical findings are 
relevant for scholars interested in aggregate capital movements, their distributional consequences 
for domestic sectors within the economy, and management of the exchange rate. 
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